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Abstract 
Enforcing in code privacy laws, internal company rules and principles like Privacy by Design 
is recognized as a challenge for the IT industry.  In this paper we analyze the steps required 
and propose a guide towards this major goal. Our proposal is to emphasize the need to 
overcome the limits of service orchestration and create strong privacy and security enabling 
architectures based on two main ideas. The first idea is to use a semantic firewall that is 
capable to check privacy properties for the communication between applications and cloud 
and between cloud's sub-systems. The second idea is to improve current SOA architectures 
with architectures based on executable choreographies that can be formally verified. In this 
paper we identify three types of executable choreographies. New types of abstraction which 
machines can verify and humans can trust are enabled by executable choreographies that act 
like truly verifiable environments for cloud applications. 
Keywords: executable choreography, semantic firewall, privacy levels, SOA for eHealth. 
1. Introduction 
Ensuring privacy and security of the information contained in electronic health records (EHR) 
is an important matter for patients and healthcare providers. In order to achieve the potential 
benefits of eHealth (e.g. better health outcomes, smarter spending, healthier people), each 
individual must trust the systems involved and the electronic exchange of information 
between them. Patients must have confidence that their electronic health information is 
complete, accurate, private and secure [13]. If information is disclosed, patients may be 
financially (e.g. stolen credit card numbers, social security numbers) or emotionally affected. 
Also, software providers can face fines and have their reputation damaged if their 
applications/systems get compromised. 
A first step in ensuring patient privacy was made from a legal point of view. Given the 
fact that governments are responsible for national healthcare, ensuring confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of patient data became a legal requirement, meaning that every 
system that deals with health data must comply with the legal reglementations. For example, 
in the United States of America, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) set national rules that apply to companies that work with sensitive patient data 
[17]. In the European Union there are laws that standardize the provision of cross-border 
eHealth services [9] and also each member state has its own national laws on electronic health 
records [18]. There are also many other countries that have implemented patient 
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confidentiality laws or are planning to. This is a good starting point, but it is not enough, 
because it is difficult for anyone to verify the privacy compliance of a certain technological 
solution [7]. 
The next layer of protection is ensured by different technologies implemented in software 
products, like encryption and de-identification [6]. But given these technologies, software 
applications that implement them and the underlying IT infrastructure must also be well 
protected. This task is very difficult, because a lot of people have access to the data 
(healthcare personnel, IT personnel). There are software applications for privacy surveillance 
that automatically detect risky behaviors made by users who are accessing patient data [12], 
but monitoring EHR applications’ usage is not enough, because an administrator or a 
programmer with access to the system can pass by the monitoring solution and directly access 
the information in the databases. Also data can be leaked through emails, chat, removable 
media etc. Thus, the underlying IT systems and employee communication must also be 
monitored and different technologies must be used in order to minimize the potential security 
breaches [16]. 
With current architectures, private data losses can go unobserved because there is always 
a high risk that many breaches evade any detection mechanisms. The growth of cloud and IoT 
(Internet of Things) applications exacerbate the privacy issues. Human only verification does 
not represent a feasible solution, except in those cases where verifications are triggered by 
high impact public scandals involving important persons or by experts discovering huge 
privacy breaches or stolen data. In e-health systems we create new risks if the technology for 
storing and processing in cloud those huge amounts of sensitive data do not stay on a very 
solid technological foundations provided by soundly designed systems. 
The concept of privacy should not be perceived in an “all or nothing” manner. It has a 
gradual nature, thus we should not only think about having privacy or not, instead we should 
analyze the levels or risk introduced by a software system (estimating the privacy level as a 
measurement of the risk that data can be copied and used outside its context). If a data breach 
occurs, it may affect the private information of a single person or may have a major social 
impact, thus it is normal to differently assess the potential risks and to categorize systems in 
different levels of privacy [8]. 
An important proposal we make is for innovations and architectures in the form of 
powerful abstractions that can be trusted and manageable by people that are not experts in IT. 
The cloud software architectures should offer transparency regarding how they manage 
private data and should be verifiable by authorities.  In our research we identified a few areas 
and some specific ideas that make it perfectly feasible to create new architectures for software 
applications that respect Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default principles. 
2. Privacy as a Risk Management Problem 
In this paper, we propose an approach based on risk assessment regarding unauthorized access 
to users’ private data. The unauthorized access notion covers both the direct access to data 
such as private life records, and the access to sensitive information that can jeopardize the 
safety and security of a larger community. 
First, we identify a series of 8 risk areas, each having a unique label that will further be 
used to describe 7 risk levels that we identified to be assignable to current software 
architectures and potentially to future ones: 
1. The DEV risk area: it includes people with access to the system’s source code. These 
may be programmers, administrators or other individuals inside the organization or 
organizations involved in the development of the system. 
2. The ADMIN risk area: it includes individuals from inside the organization that hosts 
and administers the system. This area includes unauthorized data access by 
individuals with access to the source code or databases. It covers various situations 
like a person’s  incompetency that could lead to accessing their personal passwords or 
access keys by some third party, as well as corruption (e.g. bribe) in order to gain 
access to the systems they administer for extracting sensitive data. 
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3. The HACKERS risk area: it includes random Internet individuals able to exploit, in 
commercial or destructive purposes, certain bugs in the technological stack a software 
solution is based on. 
4. The INDIVIDUAL risk area: it includes risks associated with the identification of 
facts or knowledge concerning the private life of a certain individual. The risk covers 
the ability to directly use private data concerning a certain individual or using Record 
Linkage techniques able to disclose anonymous data. The most important personal 
data risks reside in using social engineering or in compromising the various 
computers or devices one uses to log in the system. These risks cannot be efficiently 
controlled in the application’s architecture or by the cloud provider. An important 
aspect of our analysis is that the application’s provider must have a very good 
understanding, possibly with a formal proof, of the global risks regarding the data 
transmitted by the system into the cloud. The current implementation methods are 
based effectively on the unverifiable competence and assessment of the analysts, 
programmers and architects involved in creating the system. 
5. The SOCIAL risk area: it includes risks associated with unauthorized access to 
sensible data concerning national security or the security of a large community. The 
medical data of every citizen of a town, region or country is obviously an example of 
such a special risk category. 
6. The USER TRUST risk area: it includes the economic and social risks of systems 
violating the user’s privacy expectations. Cloud technologies pose the risk of being 
rejected by users because they don’t know what is shared and there is no formal 
method to check what private data are shared and with whom. We are talking about 
rational and justified concerns and not about unjustified paranoia, rumors, etc. 
7. The FORMAL TRUST risk area: it includes the economic and social risks of systems 
that were not algorithmically verified, but were designed to comply with a predefined 
set of privacy properties. The complexity of cloud systems necessitates the 
development of architectures that are able to support formal verification methods of 
privacy properties. This area includes risks regarding transmissions of data that aren’t 
anonymized or using databases that contain information that is not or is incorrectly 
anonymized (linkage techniques may deanonymize them). 
8. The BAD AGENCY risk area: it includes the risk that certain influential organizations 
obtain unauthorized information (without the consent of the data owner). These 
organizations may have very advanced technologies at their disposal and can be 
capable of placing backdoors in operating systems or hardware equipment. Thus, we 
have risks regarding the use of technologies without complying with the existing 
laws, as well as regarding the corruption of one or several individuals with access to 
the legit activities and technologies of espionage agencies.  Furthermore, such a 
backdoor created by an agency in justifiable legal circumstances, may be disclosed 
and illegally used by other entities. 
3. Privacy Stack 
The analysis of the abovementioned risk areas lead us to create and propose a privacy levels 
stack. These privacy levels are obtained by estimating the risk that unauthorized persons 
access private data. The risk assessment methods are based on formal code analysis enabling 
the identification of different types of individuals inside the organization who may eventually 
access private data outside their job description and the assessment of various external attacks 
categories resulting in information leaks. 
 
SINICA ALBOAIE  ET AL.  LEVELS OF PRIVACY FOR E-HEALTH SYSTEMS...  
  
 
Fig. 1.  Privacy stack. 
3.1. Level 1 of Privacy or Public Cloud Hosting  
This privacy level is offered by the usual PaaS systems that rent resources to tenants such as 
hospitals, private practices, etc. Although the major corporations are offering certain privacy 
guarantees, everything is covered by dense legal agreements, the practical applicability being 
difficult to prove. The rules and information reaching these systems, as well as the 
information leaks towards other entities are almost impossible to be verified and understood 
by the end user. Basically, both the tenant and the user are offering a blank cheque to the 
provider of the certain solution who is, at the same time, the administrator of the software 
solution. This kind of solutions carries the risk of theft and mass analysis of large data 
volumes by the provider’s administrators and programmers that administer the system. In 
these situations an audit does not exist and there aren’t any other barriers except those offered 
by the operating systems and the legal provisions. These offer an especially weak protection 
against some code injected by a programmer or against the actions of system or database 
administrators. These systems do not usually offer formal verification methods or enable the 
use of personal data protection technologies. Recently, companies such as Google have begun 
to implement techniques such as Differential Privacy [11] that ensure some formal 
guarantees. However, from a user or a client company perspective, should the data be 
managed by companies in different countries, the trust relationship is asymmetrical and 
impossible to validate. 
3.2. Level 2 of Privacy or Virtual Private Cloud Hosting  
This privacy level refers to using virtual machines, usually connected through VPN systems, 
that ensure a certain additional isolation against outside attacks. These systems are usually 
developed and administrated by different teams. Using a VPN between subsystems offers a 
better isolation against the outside world and may lower the level of risk deliberately induced 
by the developers. The risk level is lower because of the increased chance for the attacks to be 
detected. In all other perspectives, a private virtual cloud is just as inefficient in the protection 
of private medical data as the 1st level. 
3.3. Level 3 of Privacy or Private Cloud Hosting  
Using a private cloud reduces risks given the existence of a number of people involved in 
system administration but otherwise, it is almost identical to the 2nd level. It is possible that 
users have an increased confidence knowing that the system is not entirely hosted in a public 
cloud, but rather administrated by a trusted institution. In certain situations, the interest, 
motivation and competence level of the system administrators, as well as of the software 
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solution providers, might make the 3rd level to be inferior to the 1st or 2nd levels. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the users may experience a higher level of trust when compared 
against the 2nd and the 1st level. 
3.4. Level 4 of Privacy or Software Architectures Built Around a Semantic Firewall  
With this level we go from the area of widely used approaches in the industry to an 
experimental research area. Intuitively, a semantic firewall understands enough about the data 
transmitted to the cloud by a patient’s connected devices or sensors, with the purpose of 
warning the user if sensitive data regarding privacy is sent. Thus, the user may decide if he 
allows the application to transmit the private data outside. For such a semantic firewall to 
properly operate, ontologies that help identify risks and generate relevant warning messages 
for the end user must exist. Initiatives on using ontologies in creating a semantic firewall may 
be found in [22]. A semantic firewall may offer additional guarantees to the user covering the 
type of data transmitted in cloud, it may deduce relevant information on the anonymization 
level and the record linkage risks the users’ data is exposed to. In the 4th chapter we will 
further develop our approach on how to achieve this privacy level. 
3.5. Level 5 of Privacy or Software Architectures Build Around Verified Choreography  
The usage of formal verification models of source code is not widely applied in the industry. 
However, we suggests that instead of trying an exhaustive verification of the program’s 
correctness, one may proceed to verify limited system properties. These properties may be 
about the way the system backend stores private data or what information is sent to the 
exterior. Thus, static and dynamic code analysis methods can be applied, automatically 
proving violation of invariants or private data usage rules. The composition of Web services 
or services in general can be done in a centralized way, under the authority of a single legal 
entity, this being the case of orchestration, or otherwise decentralized, involving the 
cooperation of several individual entities, through executable choreographies. Currently there 
are few executable choreography solutions (e.g. [1] [2] [3] [5]). Static code analysis can be 
easily applied to the executable choreography systems based on swarm communication 
paradigm [swarm-communication], because they offer two separate layers for APIs and 
composition. By analyzing the use of the data models presented in the 3rd chapter, we will 
present in the next chapter a simple example of inference on private data, realized on a swarm 
executable choreography. Similar formal verification ideas for privacy properties may be 
developed for other types of orchestrations and choreographies. These verifications cannot 
entirely eliminate the risks of unauthorized private data use, but may significantly decrease 
them. 
3.6. Level 6 of Privacy or Software Architectures Built Around Encrypted 
Choreography  
The 6th level is based on the idea that using cryptographic methods in an executable 
choreography, it is possible to guarantee that different legal entities or different departments 
of a company have access to data in a way that enables them to detect unauthorized access to 
protected information. The private data will be anonymized and managed on different servers 
and administrated by different individuals in different departments. The data on a certain 
server will not make any sense on themselves and only by executing a choreography 
involving data on 3 or 4 such systems may the information be of use. In such a system, 
obtaining unauthorized access requires individuals from different institutions or departments 
to conspire. 
Executing choreographies that are verified using level 5 techniques or composing 
encrypted data only on users’ end-systems will significantly decrease the risk that system 
administrators or programmers obtain access to unauthorized data. This approach is not 
possible for all applications. To store medical imaging data or medical tests data we 
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developed prototypes proving the viability of such a system. Various patient identification 
data are anonymized and different information regarding relationships between data are stored 
encrypted on different servers, while the processing is made also on different nodes. Our 
experiments showed that a Swarm choreography system enables both manual and automated 
verification of the fact that each sub-system may only access a specific data type and has 
never access to another data type [19]. 
3.7. Level 7 of Privacy or Public Cloud Hosting  
The 7th privacy level implies that applications are no longer hosted by a single legal entity 
and that the hosting location is controlled by the user or by the provider of the medical 
solution. In this approach, the cloud services providers will offer only general hosting services 
for light virtualization systems such as Linux containers (e.g. Docker [10]). They will have 
almost no information about the type and the kind of the applications that are using their 
infrastructure. If the applications use the techniques from the 6th level, the cloud services 
providers will only see entirely anonymized data or simply encrypted data. By “serverless” 
we mean that the server side code is not hosted by the author of the application but it will be 
running anonymously in cloud in a transparent way (that can be eventually user chosen or 
randomly chosen among competing cloud providers).  For each user, private data can be 
stored and computed in a different place, making almost impossible for an attacker to access 
huge amounts of data without compromising very large parts of the cloud. Even in such 
improbable cases, an attacker will have serious difficulties because he will be required to use 
huge computational resources to understand and make sense of the collected data. 
This is the only level able to give cryptographic guarantees that the data truly belongs to 
the patient and without the decryption key stored on the patient’s own devices, the data may 
not be decrypted. These are the only systems able to lead the way for safely sharing high risk 
medical information. 
In Table 1 we present a synthesis with our proposal for levels of privacy that potential 
software architectures for cloud systems could and should sustain.  
 
Table 1. Levels of privacy and the associated risks. 
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Level 1 
Public Cloud 
high high high high high high high high 24 
Level 2 
Virtual Private 
Cloud 
may be high 
may 
be 
high high 
may 
be 
high high 21 
Level 3 
Private Cloud 
low high 
may 
be 
high may be 
may 
be 
high high 20 
Level 4 
Semantic 
Firewall 
low low 
may 
be 
may be low 
may 
be 
high high 10 
Level 5 
Verified 
Choreography 
low low 
may 
be 
low low 
may 
be 
may 
be 
low 9 
Level 6 
Encrypted 
Choreography 
no no low no no low 
may 
be 
may 
be 
6 
Level 7 
Serverless 
Choreography 
no no low no no no 
may 
be 
low 4 
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Legend: 
- no (0): there is no risk or extremely low risks; 
- low (1): there is some risk, not zero but fairly acceptable; 
- may be (2): there is a medium risk, even a  meaningful risk in some scenarios but not 
high; 
- high (3): there is a significant risk, privacy loose can happen anytime fairly easy and 
without noticing. 
4. A Privacy Properties Verification Model 
In order to verify the executable choreography and the semantic firewall properties described 
in section 3.4, we propose an abstract model based on predicate logic (first-order predicate 
calculus). The model is based on resources, privacy areas or access areas, and predicates that 
interpreted are offering a database of parent-son relationships between the resources and the 
access areas. Intuitively, the predicates represent facts from a knowledge base about the code 
used to describe models or executable choreographies. We may thus have facts such as 
“parent(R1, RP2)” or “parent(Z1, ZP2)” and facts such as “grant(Z,R)”. Parent means that 
RP2 is a parent resource for R1, the fact that ZP2 is a parent zone for Z1 or that the Z zone 
has access right on the R resource and its children. Additional predicates of the “allow(R,Z)” 
type may be inferred from this facts, based on the following inference rules: 
 
1. grant(R,Z) -> allow(R,Z) 
2. grant(R,Z1) AND parent(Z1,Z2) -> allow(R,Z2) 
3. parent(R1,R2) AND grant(R2,Z) -> allow(R1,Z) 
 
The resources may have the parent resource with the intuition that the rights on the parent 
resources are automatically transferred on the children resources. The zones may have parents 
on their turn, with the intuition that the rights of a parent zone over other resources are 
automatically transmitted to the children. 
The “allow” type predicates represent practically a conclusion resulted from the grant and 
parent relationships according to the knowledge base detected through static or dynamic code 
analysis. 
There are several approaches and even languages for specifying privacy preferences and 
policies [4] [14] [15]. Our approach is novel because it aims at demonstrating properties in an 
executable choreography system where it is important to determine which association 
between identification data and private data (represented by resources) reach the actors 
participating to the choreography (represented by the access zones). 
5. Techniques to Accomplish the Privacy Stack 
5.1. Semantic Communication Firewall for eHealth Systems 
In this section, we are proposing a semantic firewall concept especially useful for 
guaranteeing privacy properties of applications that communicate private medical data from 
mobile phones. The communication methods widely employed in the last years that are using 
web services or web sockets (SOAP, REST, etc.) are based on the assumption that they are 
communicating objects. Our approach is based on the same fact – the communication is made 
by serializing a number of objects, as they are defined in OOP (object oriented programming). 
An object is a collection of members (fields). Our analysis identified that beside the necessity 
to label an object’s members with information on their type as they are represented in the 
memory in order to be used by algorithms, it is necessary to also label the object’s members 
with information regarding privacy. We thus determined that there are data helping to identify 
the user (Identification Fields) and data sensible for the user (Personal Fields).  
According to [ontology-firewall], as “Identification Fields” we may list:  
- name, first name, date of birth and place of birth; 
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- contact information: postal address, phone number, email address; 
- IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity; 
- IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identity; 
- directory of contacts; 
- location data: GPS, IP address, Cell Id; 
- data on patient related events and activities; 
- certificates and cryptographic keys. 
As “Personal Fields” we have: 
- patient financial data; 
- any data provided by sensors concerning patient’s general health condition; 
- encrypted data. 
All the fields and the objects they compose represent, according to the formalism 
described in section 4, resources. Any data transmission to a third party means, in the 
interpretation of the mentioned formalism, the communication with an access zone. Any 
communication comprising a combination of Identification Fields and Personal Fields, 
directly or by a series of objects transmitted in succession, is creating a new type of resource 
which we will identify by a Privacy Risk type resource. 
Some information such as the IP address may be transmitted implicitly, that’s why any 
proper implementation of a semantic firewall must hide this kind of information by using 
anonymization techniques of the source address (like proxies that hide the IP address or other 
techniques such as the TOR project [20]). 
The problem of determining the confidentiality and risk levels is reduced to determining 
the existence of the facts (the truth value of the predicates) concerning “allow” (Zones, 
Privacy Risk resources). If the application communicates with a single Zone, the problem is 
quite simple, but we may easily imagine systems communicating with different access zones, 
controlled by different legal entities, such as described in section 3.7. Thus, the semantic 
firewall may both detect the private data transfer from the user’s devices (and asks for 
approval), as well as allow using several zones to reduce the risks of unauthorized private data 
leaks. 
5.2. Advanced Executable Choreographies  
In this section, we propose an interpretation model for resources and zones applicable for the 
implementation of the 5th to 7th levels of the privacy stack. As presented above, the 
verification model suggested in the 4th chapter is enabling the 3 distinct categories of 
executable choreographies. 
If the access zones are representing departments, teams or servers under the control of a 
single or various companies, we may extend the verification model beyond the simple 
communication with the cloud. The verification model identifies all the risk areas by detecting 
the “allow” predicates between these zones and the Privacy Risk resources. For example, such 
a system may automatically identify that by using external Web services there is the risk of 
transmitting private information. Furthermore, it is possible to know exactly which 
departments, servers, individuals (all representing access Zones) have access to private 
information and which combinations of private and identification information are available to 
them. Using this type of choreography does not stop data leaks caused by the inside 
personnel, but rather makes it easier for the investigation process in case of possible incidents 
and allows implementing a system access policy meant to minimize the risks. 
The encrypted choreography implies that beside verification, the system is built out of 
verifiable subsystems in order to guarantee that no single department or individual holds at 
the same time the encrypted data and the decryption keys concerning the same Privacy Risk 
resources. Thus, the administrators or the programmers of these subsystems represent a 
reduced risk. Even if in the case of certain applications this approach cannot be used, the 
encrypted choreography may minimize the risks induced by the inside individuals that must 
administer or program these systems. There is a formal guarantee that there are as few as 
possible access zones (ideally never a single one) to Privacy Risk resources. This form of 
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choreography is useful because it enables companies to guarantee by code the compliance 
with the legislation or the provisioned security regulations. 
The serverless choreography implies the development and a certain level of maturity of 
the virtualization techniques, as well as new economic application hosting models. For 
example, the Hidden Service Protocol concept from TOR [21] provides an incipient model for 
such systems. The serverless choreography implies the cloud execution and storage is made 
using encrypted choreography, while the access zones are not controlled by a single company. 
Using this type of choreography we are able to achieve a context wherein the hosting 
companies and the individuals physically administrating the hosting infrastructure have 
practically no means to significantly influence the sub-components of the hosted applications. 
The serverless choreography brings forth the opportunity that such systems that are able to 
formally guarantee advanced privacy properties may be widely available. 
6. Conclusions 
By analyzing and implementing integration systems in the medical environment, we noticed 
that from the perspective of obtaining good privacy properties we have to create novel 
approaches regarding systems architecture at the communication level , data storage and 
cloud computation. In this paper we propose 7 privacy levels applicable to analyze use cases 
and applications in the e-health field. 
In the context of the present article we approach two kinds of applications: classical 
enterprise and cloud applications that manage medical data generated by specialized health 
devices equipping private practices or hospitals, and applications that generate medical data 
using sensors and communicate data in cloud by means of patients’ own mobile devices. 
Although the two application categories are requiring different approaches and assessments 
from the perspective of private data protection, this paper aims at a unified approach that can 
be applied differently depending on the type of the application. While ideas presented in this 
article could be extended to other areas, we focus ourselves in this paper on analyzing mobile 
and Web applications that share and analyze medical data. 
 Executable choreography will create transparent and verifiable environment for cloud 
computation by providing new high level abstractions (verifiable executable choreographies) 
that machines and humans can directly monitor. Our proposal is to emphasize the need to 
overcome the limits of service orchestration and create strong privacy and security enabling 
architectures based on executable services choreography concepts. To make the patient the 
real owner of his medical data we need large scale choreography enabling distributed 
computation systems that provide safe and performant execution of  the signed code 
belonging to the “serverless” applications of the future. We foresee that is possible to create 
dynamic and static code verification technologies that automatically reject privacy breakage 
consume of unjustified resources or access to private data at large scale. This layer could also 
automatically inform the user on how their private data is used and stored, that without 
automate verification can be different from what the app provider declares or even believes. 
The privacy levels presented in this article can provide a guidance to follow developing 
medical applications that have user friendly behavior regarding privacy. 
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